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- ART. III. — 1. *Speeches of Mr. JOHN BRIGHT, M. P., at Birmingham and Manchester, on the Representation of the People.*
2. *A Letter to Mr. Bright on his Plan for turning the English Monarchy into a Democracy.* By HENRY DRUMMOND.
3. *Speech of MR. DISRAELI, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Explanation of the Reform Bill laid before Parliament by the Government of Lord Derby.*

It is the inevitable tendency of a government like that of England, to be more or less absolutely controlled by some one of its elements. At the era of the French Revolution, and for a hundred years previously, as well as during the subsequent struggle with Napoleon, the aristocracy were the ruling power. But since that period the democratic element has been rising into the chief place, and the control of affairs is surely passing into the hands of the Commons. The Reform Act of 1832 was a severe blow to the ascendancy of oligarchical power, and though it is frequently asserted that, since the passage of that memorable bill, the House of Commons has been less distinguished for ability than before, it may be confidently affirmed that this has been owing, in large measure, to the fact that the last quarter of a century has not been adapted to develop such political abilities as were stimulated and brought into action by the great events of the previous period. Besides, in judging of the merits and consequences of the Reform Bill, we must consider the ameliorating measures that have since been adopted. Tested by that standard, it must be conceded that the extension of suffrage, and the redistribution of Parliamentary seats by the legislation of 1832, have been productive of immense good. The question now is, Shall the basis of that legislation be still further enlarged? Shall the democratic element in the British Constitution be still further increased in power and influence?

One class of British society are in favor of a new reform bill, because they believe that political justice and national well-being alike demand it. Another class are invincibly opposed to it, because they see, or think they see, in such a

concession, the transfer of power from the aristocracy to the Commons, and along with it the ultimate overthrow of the distinctive principles of the Constitution. A third class, composed of rival parties, yield to it, not because they desire it, but because party exigences demand it. They will concede, however, as little as possible, — as much only as will enable them to gain or retain the control of public affairs.

We may regard Mr. Bright as a representative of the first class, Mr. Drummond of the second, and Mr. Disraeli of the third. Mr. Bright is a powerful speaker, — not an orator, indeed, in the sense in which Chatham and Mirabeau were orators, but a man who hits hard blows and makes a strong impression. Without much learning, and without systematic culture, he has strong natural abilities, extensive and intimate familiarity with the political history of his country since he came upon the stage, indomitable courage, and sturdy independence. He has little reverence for the past, sees things as they are, and is not likely to be misled by illusions. His estimate of the British Constitution differs radically from Mr. Burke's. He does not behold in King, Lords, and Commons "the triple cord which no man can break; the solemn, sworn, constitutional frank-pledge of this nation; the firm guaranties of each other's being and each other's rights; the joint and several securities, each in its place and order, for every kind and every quality, of property and of dignity." On the contrary, he has no reverence for the Constitution of England as it now exists.

"I have no object," he said in his speech at Birmingham, "in making these observations, but to show to the people that they have been deluded by the idea that they have a glorious — that is, an excellent — Constitution. The Constitution of this country, said to be of a King or Crown, Lords, and Commons, is, in fact, an imposture, — an imposture which I take it to be a part of my duty to expose. John Foster, speaking of the English Constitution, spoke of it as that canted and extolled humbug. They tell us we owe everything to this Constitution. Now, I deny it altogether."

Sentiments of this kind startle such men as Mr. Drummond; they sound like the tocsin of revolution. But Mr. Drummond,

whimsical, mystical, prejudiced, and absurd as his pamphlet proves him, though he is described as outspoken and scholarly, is not of force to arrest the movements of this energetic and practical age. He may amuse or annoy an opponent; he may gratify his own spleen, and pander to the spleen of others, by vulgar abuse of this country; yet it is not such adversaries that the friends of reform have to dread, but rather those who in reality entertain his opinions, who dislike reform quite as much as he does, and still, with their eyes fixed steadily on office, attempt to delude the country with such a bill as the government of Lord Derby laid before Parliament at the opening of the last session.

Mr. Disraeli, with ready speech, versatile talents, suppleness, and aptitude for affairs, may explain and defend with great show of reason the various provisions of this bill; but it is apparent upon the most cursory examination, that its leading, governing design and principle was, to preserve the ascendancy of the aristocratic element in the House of Commons. Indeed, Mr. Disraeli vindicates, and with a great deal of ingenuity, this feature of his plan. He utterly rejects the notion that representation should be proportioned either to wealth, to population, or to both combined. His theory of representation regards only what he is pleased to term the interests of a country, by which he means classes and opinions. "Men," he says, "are sent to this House to represent the opinion^s of a place, and not its power." Hence it is, that his bill made no provision for a redistribution of seats in the Commons, and preserved, with the exception of a few glaring anomalies, the existing borough system. It did, indeed, extend the privilege of election to a considerable degree, but with such cautious discrimination as to exclude the great body of the working classes. But, even with the utmost extension of the elective franchise, so long as the House of Commons is constituted as at present, the result is the same.

"There are," said Mr. Bright in his speech at Birmingham,— "there are in the House of Commons at present 330 members (more than half) whose whole number of constituents do not amount to more than 180,000, and there are at the same time in Parliament 24 members, whose constituents are upwards of 200,000 in number;

and, while the constituents of the 330 members are assessed to the property tax at £15,000,000, the constituents of the 24 members are assessed to the same tax at more than £24,000,000."

Now Mr. Disraeli would not only maintain this unjust and unequal distribution of political power, but would make it even more unjust and unequal. By extending the suffrage he increases the disproportion between the constituency of the twenty-four members and the constituency of the three hundred and thirty members, without any change whatever in the relative number of the representatives. And upon what ground does he defend a scheme like this? Upon the fanciful notion that the chief element of representation should be the interests, or, in other words, the classes and opinions of a country, rather than its wealth and population. Admit this, however, to be the correct theory: does it follow that no sort of equality should be observed in fixing the ratio of representation between these various classes or interests? Must the opinions of a score of voters in a midland borough counterbalance the opinions of fifteen or twenty thousand voters in Liverpool or Manchester? Must the political influence of one class, and that the smallest, outweigh the political influence of all other classes? Must a constituency of 180,000 send 330 members to Parliament as the representatives of their opinions, and a constituency of 200,000 send only 24 members to represent theirs? To plain republicans such a scheme of representation appears unjust, — so unjust as to be scandalous.

That it cannot be much longer maintained is obvious. The Derby government has owed its existence thus far to the liberal members; and if that government should be overthrown, and Lord Palmerston again resume office, their support would doubtless be equally necessary to him. Holding this important position, and resolutely insisting upon a reform of the House of Commons, it is impossible that they should not carry their point. They may not, indeed, obtain in the first instance all that they desire; but they will gain vastly more than is proffered by the bill of Mr. Disraeli. Lord Palmerston will concede more than Lord Derby; he will be compelled, by the exigences of his position as a party leader, to

come forward with a more satisfactory proposition, — a proposition which, though it may not fully meet the views or wishes of the sincere friends of reform, will be an advanced stage in their progress towards the goal at which they would arrive.

Moreover, when it happens, as happen it will, that the great body of the nation is included in the list of electors, and representation is proportioned to population, or to population and property combined, then England becomes, not in theory only, but in practice, a republic, though a republic under a monarchical form. The crown even now is but a pageant, the ornamental plumage of the noble bird, not the feathers that support him in his flight.

With a full and impartial representation of the people in the House of Commons, with an hereditary executive and an hereditary Senate or House of Lords, England would possess, according to the ideas of Polybius, a perfect polity. There would be that apt contexture of the three forms of government in the general frame which, as he thinks, produces the co-operation, mutual counteraction, and reciprocal control of the parts necessary to constitute a perfect political system. Let the hereditary principle be rejected (as it is likely to be in the progress of time), and the representative principle be substituted for it, England becomes a republic on the plan of our American constitutions. And what is there in this prospect, beyond the loss of power and privilege, that should excite such lively alarm in those whose cause finds a champion in Mr. Drummond? What, in fact, are the characteristic influences and effects of democratic institutions? It may be well, at a time like this, when the organs of one class of opinions and interests in England, from the apprehension of being Americanized, assail our republican system with studied disparagement and insidious censure, to consider this question, — to refresh and confirm our faith in that government which was contrived by the patriots of the Revolution, and which they fondly believed would preserve the liberties and establish the independence of their country. What, then, are the characteristic influences and effects of democratic institutions?

We answer, that they give to society a vital impulse and energy which no other description of government has been able to impart. The sense of personal independence and personal consequence which they inspire, raises and develops even the humblest individual. His faculties impose the only limit to his ambition, the only bound to his aims and endeavors. Hence the immense force, the restless exertion, of democratic communities. The ancient republics, — what brilliancy, what activity, in arts, in arms, in philosophy, letters, and industry, characterized all their career! Their achievements in war and in peace have been the admiration of every succeeding age. The prodigious prosperity of the Italian republics, their renown in all the arts that ennoble and embellish life, and in all the modes of industry that add to its comfort and enjoyment, sprang directly from their freedom.

While popular institutions thus quicken individual energies, and elevate society in all its constituent classes, they claim at the same time this peculiar praise, that they more fully identify the citizen with the state than any other form of government, and by this means foster an intense and lofty patriotism. Every man feels himself a part of the commonwealth, and its honor is as dear to him as his own. In monarchies, the habit of loyalty is, without doubt, a powerful tie, — a motive which in the hour of peril or trial goes far and does much. But, in all wars except those which are strictly national, and arouse a whole population to the defence of their altars and their fires, it may be confidently affirmed that the citizen of a republic comes forth with more alacrity at the call of his country than the subject of a monarchy. He has more of personal interest in all that concerns the government under which he lives; he is an indirect but influential agent in the administration of its affairs, watches with eager interest its course, and whenever difficulty or danger impends, with something more than a sense of duty or spirit of loyalty, acts boldly and greatly in its service. It is this personal interest and participation in the government of his country that animate and exalt the patriotism of a freeman. In addition to all those ties that inspire love of country, attachment to the land of his birth, the home of his ancestors, and the repository of

their ashes, he has a sense of property in, of identification with, all the acts of the state.

At the same time, it may be affirmed that popular governments are less prone to war than monarchies. It is said, indeed, that the tastes and qualifications of the many, in all countries and under all systems of polity, lean towards the warlike virtues, and that in free states those tastes and qualifications can demand scope and employment, and hence wars are precipitated. The ancient republics are cited as an illustrative example. So far, it is alleged, were personal independence and personal ambition fostered by their institutions, that war and conquest, the storm and hurricane of life, could alone satisfy them. Undoubtedly, the ancient republics were warlike, and discovered a passion for the excitement and glory of arms; but this was the fault, the characteristic mark of their age, not of their systems of government. In our day, with the votaries of peace numerous and increasing, combined with the powerful classes who in every country are directly interested in its preservation, wars must inevitably become less frequent whenever and wherever these classes exercise a check, a control on government. In democratic states, through public opinion, through the press, and the ballot, they possess this check, this decisive means of enforcing respect for their pacific sentiments. In monarchies, on the contrary, with standing armies, with the military spirit habitually cherished, with the ambition, whims, caprices, and family connections of the monarch, as added motives to war, what wonder is it that the earth so frequently shakes beneath the tread of hostile forces, and drinks up the blood of the bravest and the best?

Popular governments are not only less liable to external war than monarchies, but they are less exposed to internal convulsion. There may, indeed, be local and temporary turbulence, there may be passionate excitement bursting out into acts of violence; but all this, like the passing wind, only agitates the surface, while the world of waters beneath remains undisturbed. That which shakes the foundations of society, that which precipitates revolutions, has been extinguished in its very germ. Equality of rights and privileges—the boon

so eagerly coveted by mankind — is consecrated and insured. By incorporating this principle into the very texture of society, popular governments remove the prevalent cause of civil and revolutionary strife. No class endowed with hereditary political power or superior immunities stands as a barrier to essential progress.

Hence desirable changes are accomplished peacefully through the medium of constitutional forms. In monarchies, on the contrary, when the laws and customs are no longer adapted to existing circumstances, when they inflict even misery and injustice, it is difficult to procure their abrogation without the convulsive struggles of revolution. Those who have been long habituated to a system, who derive all its benefits and feel none of its mischiefs, naturally cling to it. Besides, they dread the consequences of disturbing the existing order of things. Change is denounced and frowned upon, lest, when it begins, it may be hard to restrain it, — lest it may slowly, but surely, sap the foundations upon which exclusive privilege reposes. All the influence of authority, of confirmed prejudices, of interested fears, is aroused and arrayed against reform. Hence, without other means of redress to the suffering classes, revolution, which is among the direst evils that can befall a state, and in the height of its fury tends to involve the whole fabric in one mighty ruin, is called in to achieve that which, under a different system, concurring interests or a provident foresight would naturally have anticipated. It was, as all the world knows, the threat and apprehension of revolution that wrung from the reluctant hands of the English aristocracy the reform legislation of 1832.

In a popular government, neither the sympathies nor the interests of the law-makers are bound up with a caste or order, whose power and perpetuity, whose weight and influence in the present and future, are primary objects of concern ; but they are identified with the great body of the people, and for weal or woe must partake their fortune. Hence the greatest good of the greatest number is the distinguishing principle of popular legislation. There may be mistakes, there may be rash resolves, in moments of excitement or delusion ; but the steady and uniform tendency will be to promote the interests

and well-being of the greatest possible number. Such being for the most part the evident result, the law comes to have a fixed and firm hold upon the respect and reverence of a free people. In doing homage to law, they do homage to themselves, the creators and preservers of law. And a state without this reverence for law reposes on a foundation which may indeed last long, but is in danger every moment of subversion. It may impress the spectator with an idea of durable existence, but while he gazes, the structure may fall to the ground. Whenever, from any cause, the influence upon the imagination and the moral feeling of men which is exerted by long-established institutions, and the adventitious authority which naturally attaches itself to whatever is old, are lost or impaired, there is no other foundation upon which the despotic legislator can build, except fear, which, Protean in form, may suddenly assume the aspect of ferocity, and avenge its humiliation in the overthrow of all law and all authority.

Popular institutions not only inspire a respect for law, but they beget self-respect. Hence, we see in republican states nothing of that servile thralldom of mind which is so apparent in other conditions of society. Manners, indeed, which, as has been finely observed, throw a pleasing illusory charm over human nature, may not be carried to so high a standard of refinement as among the superior classes in monarchies. But manners, however pleasing, however necessary “to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature,” may be acquired at too great a sacrifice. It is better to protect and exalt the many, than to bless and adorn the few. It is better to strengthen and enlarge the foundations of the social edifice, than to lavish wealth and splendor upon its higher stories. It is better to cultivate the sentiment of brotherhood, to pour over the surface of society the balsam of charity and kindness, to engage men in common labors, common aims, and common sympathies, than to isolate and separate them by gradations of rank. By so doing, there may, indeed, be less lustre, but there will be more harmony, — a less showy, but a more happy country.

A popular government presupposes not only the removal of all restraints upon the dissemination of knowledge, but the

adoption of all practicable measures to diffuse it as widely as possible. All authority having its rise and fountain in the people, it can hardly be conceived that they would employ it to put a padlock on their minds, and shut up the sources of information. Besides, participation in the daily affairs of their government opens and enlightens their minds. Such a people must necessarily discover a clearness of understanding, a practical sagacity, a facility in affairs, unequalled by any other. And while the mass of citizens in democratic states hold this high place in the scale of intelligence, history abundantly proves that they also contribute their full quota to the roll of the world's choice and master spirits.

What lustre was diffused around their country by the famous orators, philosophers, statesmen, and soldiers of republican Greece! Recall, too, the history of the modern Italian republics. What talents in every variety were summoned forth to grace and serve the state! In architecture, in sculpture, in painting, in poetry, history, and politics, republican Italy produced the great masters whose art and genius enlightened the darkness of that night which then enveloped the world. But not to confine our view to former times, let us turn our eyes to our own country. Let us see if, as is alleged by our impartial and friendly English critics, the character of our institutions has dwarfed talents, and sunk them to what has been termed the populous host of mediocrity.

Scarcely eighty years have gone by since our independence was achieved, and although we have had to encounter the obstacles naturally incident to a new country, and were compelled in the first instance to employ all our energies in recovering from the impoverishment of a long war, yet in letters, in all forms of civil and military ability, we have kept fully abreast of contemporary states which have existed for a thousand years.

But, says the leading journal of England, your statesmanship has declined, and declined in consequence of the universal participation of the people in the affairs of your government; in other words, in consequence of universal suffrage. Precisely the same thing is said of the representation of England in the House of Commons, and the fact is attributed to the

Reform Bill. We have already adverted to the circumstance, that the political events of the last quarter of a century have not been of a character to stimulate and bring into activity striking political abilities. Those who have shone most conspicuously in public life during that time, in either country, received their training and impulse in the previous period. That race of our statesmen who came into the national councils just before or just after the second war with England, had to grapple with great questions and imperilled interests, and the excitement and conflict of high debate gave tone and elevation to their minds. If our present representation in Congress has fallen below their measure, it is not attributable to universal suffrage; but, in good part, to the fact that the pabulum of our political life is of a less invigorating nature.

We know it is said, and Lord John Russell adopts the notion in his recent *Life of Fox*, that the natural jealousy of a democracy has led the American people to elevate their inferior men to the Presidency, in preference to their statesmen of reputation and ability. This assertion is altogether unwarrantable. That it has happened, in one or more instances, that candidates inferior to their competitors in point of talents have been raised to the highest office in our government, may be admitted. But why impute this fact to mean prejudices and unworthy motives? Will Lord John Russell pretend that it would be creditable to an intelligent people to choose for the chief of their state a man whose principles were wholly discordant with their own, merely because he possessed more shining talents than his competitor? Has not his experience taught him that a man may possess great metaphysical, logical, or oratorical abilities, and yet in the administration of public affairs be wanting in wisdom? The opinions of great masses of men on practical questions, affecting their interests, are very apt to be right. The individual, however eminent for talents, may be biased by social habitudes, or local and temporary influences, and thus be deflected from the true policy. If the collective wisdom, therefore, of a people sees what the individual fails to see, if they withhold their suffrages from an eminent personage because of the principles he advocates and represents, let it not be said that they are either

incapable of discerning his merit, or indisposed, from a spirit of jealousy, to do honor to it. But after all, what member of the house of Hanover, coming to the throne, as Mr. Burke might say, in contempt of popular election, could be compared in point of abilities with the least illustrious name in the roll of our Presidents?

It is objected to popular institutions, that they foster a love of gain, and tend to make physical prosperity the goal of their citizens. Mr. Drummond, with facile calumny, declares that "they (the Americans) are utterly without private or public honor, and the only people on earth who ever avowed that gain was their sole object in every relationship of life." In what form and through what organs this extraordinary avowal has been made, Mr. Drummond has not thought proper to inform us. If he means to imply that our actions speak that language, we may be pardoned for applying the same test to his own countrymen. Are the English less moderate in their desire and exertions for gain than ourselves? Are they not emphatically the shop-keeping nation? If it be true, as is affirmed by one of the most charming of their poets, that

"Honor sinks where commerce long prevails,"

it ill becomes an Englishman to boast of any superiority on that score. Mr. Drummond is a scholar, and is, doubtless, familiar with the history of the aristocratic governments of Rome, Carthage, and Venice. As an Englishman and a member of Parliament, the annals of his own country have naturally attracted much of his attention; and he must know that there has never been exhibited by any class of mankind such rapacity, such eagerness to obtain riches, as by the governing class in aristocratic states. The corruption, the venality, and the "jobs" that have distinguished and tainted the English government in times past, are matters of familiar history.

That the citizens of republics are remarkable for the ardor with which they pursue gain, we do not mean to deny. But they seek it in the paths of business, in adventures by sea and land, not from the influence of a mistress or the favor of a minister. "The Athenians," says Thucydides, "con-

tinue ever amid labors and dangers, enjoying nothing through sedulity to acquire, esteeming that only a time of festival in which they are prosecuting their projects, and holding rest as a greater evil than the most laborious business."

This boundless activity, this inextinguishable love of exertion, is indeed a characteristic distinction of democratic states. It is this which explores the mine, unlocks the secret treasures of the earth, whitens the seas with the canvas of unnumbered ships, diversifies industry, and stimulates intellect. Nevertheless, the passion of acquisition among such a people is not more eager than in a different condition of society; but it is more apparent, because the sources for its gratification are more numerous. More avenues are opened, the masses are not shackled by the habit of dependence, are conscious of their powers, and accustomed to rely on them. Their freedom gives them boldness, confidence, and a spirit of enterprise. Yet, if eager in acquiring, they are equally liberal in expending wealth. Nowhere is money more freely given for patriotic and beneficent purposes; nowhere do philanthropy and public spirit thrive so well as in republican soil.

Indeed, when we contemplate the benefits that flow from this description of polity as from a natural fountain, when we see the immense energies that are developed, and the immense advances that society makes under its auspices, what manly, generous mind would not wish it endued with an inherent strength, and fitted to survive for the good of mankind to the latest ages of the world? But forms of government, like every other contrivance of human wisdom, are mutable, and subject to decay. Time, which defaces the inscription and crumbles the marble, leaves untouched nothing beneath the sun.

What is to be the future fortune of our own political system it is vain to conjecture. This much is certain, — to preserve our institutions, we must preserve and foster an habitual respect for them. Fleets and armies cannot maintain them. The foundations on which they repose are not of material structure. They are based on ideas, and will continue to bless, develop, and accelerate our country on its great career, so long as the principles and sentiments of their founders shall

animate their posterity. When these no longer hold sway, the form may indeed survive, but the animating soul of the republic will have departed.

It has not escaped observation, that familiarity with European society has already led many of our social and literary *dilettanti* to regard European institutions with no unfavorable eye. The gayety and glitter of foreign courts and capitals have dazzled their imaginations, and they have come to undervalue the freedom which has given their country its position among the nations. They might remind us of some rigid Protestant, whose antipathy to Rome would do no discredit to a Presbyterian of the school of Knox; yet who, when he comes to tread "the long-drawn aisle" of a venerable cathedral, covered with "the awful hoar of innumerable ages," to listen to the pealing anthem, and to witness the imposing ceremonies of an earlier worship, abandons his life-long convictions to the illusion of the passing hour.

But the great body of our citizens, all those who constitute the strength and ornament of their country, are devoted to its institutions with a warm and earnest attachment. They contemplate the past with pride, they anticipate the future with hope. The strictures that reach them from the Old World, whether clothed in the considerate phrase of a Russell or the envenomed language of a Drummond, do not abate their confidence or disturb their equanimity. They know that a successful republic is a pungent and ever-recurring criticism upon monarchy and aristocracy; that it awakens mankind to reflection, and engenders a love of liberty; that it is, in fine, at once an argument and an example, whose persuasive force summons the nations to demand institutions that shall recognize and guarantee their rights. They are not surprised, therefore, that those whose repose is thus disturbed, and whose power and privileges are endangered, should seek to disparage a government whose silent operation is productive of such results.

But they are neither so blind nor so prejudiced as not to know that perfection is unattainable in human affairs, and that evils are inseparable from every form of government. They have the sense and sagacity, however, to perceive that,

while there are faults in the details and the practical working of their institutions, they possess excellences peculiar to themselves. It is not occasional irregularity, violence, or maladministration, whether state or municipal, resulting in whole or in part from the ordinary machinery, as it were, of their system, that can disaffect them with the general principles on which the system itself is founded. The essence of republicanism does not consist in the ballot and universal suffrage, as many persons seem to suppose. Doubtless, it is in the theory, as it should be in the practice of a republic founded on just principles, that those from whom it is derived, for whose benefit it was established, and whose contributions support it, should, by their suffrages, have the control of it. But every political society necessarily possesses the right of self-protection; and if any portion of its members, from vice or ignorance, from mental or moral defects, are incompetent to take a part in the administration of its affairs, they should be disfranchised. It would be well if our legislators would give a little more heed to this obvious truth.

In towns and cities where population is largely concentrated, and where a considerable portion of that population were the former subjects of England, and bred under a system which makes no provision for the instruction of youth, and keeps the great body of the people ignorant of political duties, it is highly impolitic to confer indiscriminately the privilege of election. The compatriots of Mr. Drummond should continue *in statu pupillari* until they become familiar with political rights, and imbibe a proper sense of political duties. Hereafter, when the British system shall have been reformed, they will receive that preliminary training at home which will qualify them for more immediate admission to the privileges of citizenship upon their arrival in this country. With a proper restriction of the right of suffrage, a proper check upon the unwise multiplication of elective offices, and a more discreet and attentive exercise of the privilege of election on the part of those who are most interested in a politic administration of affairs, we shall guard against that municipal misgovernment, wastefulness, and corruption, which have tended to bring reproach on our whole system.

But whatever the defects which a friendly or an unfriendly criticism may point out either in the foundation or superstructure of our institutions, in the organic law, or the details of legislation, the general result of the system is obvious. The generation of our countrymen now passing off the stage of action are nearly as old as the government under which they live; yet what prodigies have they witnessed! They have seen our boundaries enlarged, our resources developed, our weakness converted into strength, and our power acknowledged and respected by the most distant nations. Our territory, which even at the outset was deemed by European statesmen too vast and extended, is now washed by the waters of two oceans; capacious harbors indent its shores; immense rivers bear the products of thriving industry to the seas; populous towns and cities are scattered over the land; thought is unshackled, education diffused, and liberty insured. With a vast confederation of States, comprising every variety of climate, soil, and production, with innumerable cities, the natural centres of commerce, manufactures, and arts, with immense lines of railway stretching across the continent from ocean to ocean, and with such an administration of the government as will give us contentment at home and respect abroad, we shall present to the world an instance of beneficent power unparalleled in the annals of mankind.

ART. IV. — *Correspondence of CHARLES, first MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.* Edited, with Notes, by CHARLES ROSS, ESQ. London: John Murray. 1859. 3 vols. 8vo. pp. xvi. and 560, 577, 621.

LORD CORNWALLIS played a conspicuous part in the history of three continents. In the American war he held an independent command in this country; and after ravaging the Southern Colonies he closed his career here by the capitulation of Yorktown. Returning to England, he was subsequently appointed Governor-General of India, where he gained several